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Vote for Peace 2010 (or Vote Peace) is a non-partisan nationwide initiative with a mission to create a political environment conducive to the conduct of a free, fair and peaceful conduct of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.  Vote Peace 2010 aims to: 1) effectively monitor incidents of election violence during the election period; 2) minimize election conflict and incidents of election violence; 3) provide appropriate political response to acts or incidents of election violence; and 4) exact political costs to perpetrators of election violence.

Vote Peace is a project of the Consortium on Electoral Reform (CER) and has Vote Peace Response Teams (VPRTs) in selected regions and provinces across the country, especially where election hot spot areas are located.  Vote Peace has established coordinative if not working relations with various election stakeholders, especially with the Bantay-Eleksyon Monitors in the context of monitoring ERVIs.  The focused areas of Vote Peace are the provinces of Abra, Nueva Ecija, Masbate, Samar Island, Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Basilan and Sulu.  It is also closely watching developments in Davao City, Compostela Valley, Batangas, Quezon, Isabela and Sultan Kudarat.

This report covers the period from January 10, 2010 (the official start of the election period) to March 25, 2010 (day before the campaign period for local election starts).  Vote for Peace 2010 shall continue monitoring incidents of election-related violence and facilitate peace initiatives until the election period ends on June 9, 2010.  This report attempts to come out with recommendations to the public and key election stakeholders in the pursuit of a free, fair, orderly and peaceful elections.

There are thirty-nine (39) incidents of election-related violence during the period of January 10 and March 25, as monitored by VotePeace. The last available data from the PNP had 26 election-related violent incidents (ERVIs) from January 10, 2010 to February 28, 2010. These figures compare well with the figures recorded during the same election period of 2007.

As of March 19, 2007, the PNP already tallied 29 cases of election-related violence. Throughout the election period of 2007, the PNP Task Force Hope recorded 226 incidents of election-related violence while the Bantay-Election Monitor had 317 incidents.

What are significant though are numbers and profile of victims and the nature of incidents.  Nearly every incident has fatality and most of these are election candidates, campaign operators and security aides of candidates.  Further, the character of the incidents is that of a prominently directed shooting—murder and assassination. This means that the perpetrated violence is planned, targeted and with the objective to kill.

Several initiatives for peaceful elections were conducted or are scheduled to be held in various areas and levels – provincial, city and municipal.  These are mainly in the form of Multi-Stakeholders Assemblies for Peaceful Elections among non-partisan election groups, and Covenants for Peace among the involved candidates. These are initiatives prominently led either by the AFP, PNP or the COMELEC through the Joint Security Coordinating Committees.  Others are primarily initiated by the local Church leaders and/or Civil Society Organizations in partnership with the JSCC.

Despite sporadic incidences, peaceful electoral environment is generally holding on in areas where there are peace activities such as signing of peace covenants among election candidates.

The upsurge in ERVIs is partly explained by the fact that the conditions for election violence still remain: the presence of partisan armed groups and the communist guerrillas, the proliferation of illegal firearms, and the intense political rivalries among competing candidates.

Where these conditions are not present or due to the various peace initiatives, the political environment conducive to the conduct of free, orderly and peaceful elections still prevails in most part of the country.

However, there are still some things to watch out for.  There are  at least 112 partisan armed groups (PAGs), the insurgency even now is ongoing and impacts on the elections, and there is a political crisis that still burns as resulted from the questioned 2004 elections. There is deep distrust existing among contending parties at the national level and in many local areas. Even as the manual system of elections has been discarded and the new automated election system is being put in place, many still do not trust the latter and the new Commission on Elections that implements it.

Even with the temporary dip in election violence as a result of the public outrage over the Maguindanao massacre, the grave danger of intensified election violence under such existing conditions is not yet belittled. The various efforts to effect peace covenants in some areas still have to bear fruits in terms of a lasting peaceful environment throughout the election period.

MONITORED INCIDENTS OF ELECTION VIOLENCE

(January 10 to March 25, 2010)

Election violence can be defined as any random or organized act that cause psychological and/or physical harm or death to any person or group of people and/ or that may determine, delay, or otherwise influence and electoral process.  Acts or incidents of election violence, intended or otherwise, can be actual threat, physical assault, destruction of property, violent disruption of political activity, shooting, assassination, murder, arson, among others.

Election violence has various effects depending on the nature, scale and gravity of the incident/s.  The immediate results may either be physical and/or psychological harm to the victim/s; loss or damage to property; or loss of lives; or combinations of all.  In traditionally violent areas, people learned to live with the fear of what had happened, but not with uncertainty about what might happen: shootings that would hit a family member in the crossfire; grenade explosion that would maim or wound a neighbor; ballot snatching that would place fears to the teacher’s children; burning of classrooms that terrorize voters.  It may also affect or influence the behavior or decision-making process of voters – to vote or not to vote; or whom to vote.  Election violence also impacts on the electoral process – the delay in conduct or cancellation of voting.  Election violence combined with fraud may also be influence or determine election results such that the credibility of the electoral process is compromised.  Even the political legitimacy of the winning candidate may also be questioned.

The following data were gathered from area reports of Vote Peace Response Teams (VPRTs); the print media and police report.

Region V registered the highest number of incidents from January 10 to March 25, with 11 incidents followed by Regions III with 5 incidents, and IV-A/ARMM, each with 4 incidents.  The most number of incidents in Region V (Bicol) occurred in Masbate (10 out of 11) where involvement of Partisan Armed Groups and the New People’s Army is prominent.

It should be noted that Masbate alone already had registered a total of nine election violence since last year.  Despite that the PNP had already deployed around 80 special forces since January.

Overall, six of the total 39 incidents involved armed men believed to be members of the NPA guerrillas (5 incidents) and one by elements of the MILF. The eleven soldiers killed in Mansalay, Mindoro Oriental were ambushed by the NPA going after the latter allegedly going rounds collecting PTC fees.

The high number of fatalities shows an alarming rate of one for every incident.  The character of the incidents is premeditated – premeditated attack; murder; attempted murder; ambush; and assassination.  It means that the acts of violence are planned with identified target.  This is shown by the most number of candidates killed, closely followed by political operators/leaders and barangay officials believed to be allied or working with a candidate.

The operations were mostly carried out by motorcyle-riding men armed with .45 cal. pistols and/or M16 rifles.  Except for the incidents where the alleged perpetrators are NPA guerrillas or MILF rebels, the operations show that attackers are either partisan armed groups or paid killers hired by the principals.

Post-November 23 Massacre

The barbaric and gruesome massacre in Ampatuan town in Maguindanao in November 23, 2009 that claimed 57 lives and disturbed the nation’s mind, however unacceptable, may have factored to the general slowdown of incidents (See table below).  The post-Nov. 23 violent incidents in Maguindanao until January 9 can be related more to acts of hatred or rido arising from the massacre.  Still, ARMM recorded a mere 3 incidents in the national number of incidents, which is 39.  Will the “unusual peace” in ARMM stay?

PEACE INITIATIVES

Unlike previous elections, there are many and various initiatives for an orderly and peaceful conduct of elections in May 2010.  Prominent initiators are civil society organizations, and the AFP and PNP through the JSCC.  What is striking is the absence or lack of lead role of the Comelec, which is supposed to be the lead convenor of the JSCC.

So far, peaceful environment is holding on in most areas where peace initiatives were undertaken.

On the other hand, there are also candidates resistant or unwilling to participate in said initiatives.  Striking here is the resistance and non-participation of a Governatorial candidate. of Masbate to the extent of discouraging one of the primary movers for peaceful election in the province.  Immediately after the Masbate Peace Activity on March 9, Fr. Leo Casas of DIMASAFI received an envelope with a bullet inside.

AREAS TO WATCH OUT

1. DAVAO CITY – the rivalry between two contending camps is getting intense each day so much that the Davaoeños are feeling the heat of possible open untoward incidents.  One camp is highly accused of having “death squads” while the other has behind him Ret. Gen. Palparan who holds the label of being “the butcher.”
2. MONCAYO, COMPOSTELA VALLEY – the stakeholders of gold-rich Mt. Diwalwal are currently directly involved in the local elections, coupled with the participation of Mancao as a congressional candidate.  What complicate the unstable political environment are the NPA guerrillas and roving-armed bands of the Ampatuans seeking survival.
3. MASBATE – the participating political clans are in survival mood – politically, and have been resistant to peace initiatives conducted and redeployment of police authorities in the province.
4. SORSOGON, QUEZON, MINDORO ORIENTAL and OCCIDENTAL, and NEGROS ORIENTAL – the intense political rivalries among contending parties is complicated by the aggressive operations of the NPA guerrillas against the police and military and for collecting PTCs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The COMELEC should declare the entire province of Masbate “under Comelec control” given the continued presence of threat groups such as the Partisan Armed Groups and the New People’s Army; the spasmodic eruption of untoward incidents; and the threat poised by some politicians allegedly having partisan armed groups. Provided however, that the multi-sectoral group should form part on the selection process  of filling the vacant position for Masbate Provincial Comelec Administrator;

2. Likewise, Maguindanao be put under COMELEC control until such time that Provincial Comelec Revamp was made; in its limitation however, an option for holding an election separately from the national conduct is strongly recommended;
3. The COMELEC should call for a Coordinative Conference among the AFP, PNP, Comelec and other election stakeholders to enhance coordination and collaborative work.

4. The poll body should also assign additional AFP and PNP personnel in Masbate and Maguindanao even if the latter remains under “State of Emergency.”

5. The PNP should aggressively pursue initiatives towards the neutralization and dismantling of identified and suspected partisan armed groups.  The PNP should also disclose to the media and public those politicians still maintaining and/or forming new partisan armed groups.